



Global Migration Policy Associates

*An International research, policy development,
advisory services and advocacy group*

***MIGRATION FUTURES
DEMOGRAPHICS, DEVELOPMENT & GOVERNANCE
Focus on Eurasia***

Introduction

The Eurasia region faces immense challenges to redevelop and to maintain viable economies. In context of oil and gas export dependent economies, ageing and declining work forces in some countries, and urgent need for new skills, migration is a key factor.

However, current policy trends coupled with rising social contention suggest that governments are not at all 'getting it right' to assure a productive economic future nor social cohesion. A review of conditions driving migration, realities across Eurasia and the proven governance framework offers perspective towards improving governance of migration to assure future economic and social well-being for countries and peoples of the region.

Imperative of international mobility

Development has meant the evolution of ever more complex material and economic means, technology, demographics and social-political factors. Under globalization, this evolution has given rise to worldwide interdependence and mobility of capital, goods, services, technology, knowledge, and, objectively, of people.

The evolution and diversification of technology along with transformations and relocation of industrial processes as well as changes in the organization of work itself are constant characteristics of the world of work today. This continual evolution requires accelerating complexity, diversity and specialization in the competencies and skills of work forces in every country.

No country today can train the entire range of evolving skills and competencies needed to perform the complex work done on its territory in a globalized economic context. The result is demand for specialized skills not available locally and that cannot be met locally. Skills needs evolve more quickly than training systems, while displaced and older workers cannot in many cases be retrained for new technologies and skills sets. Even if disposition exists, the technological basis, the facilities, and available specializations may not be adequate. In some countries, the institutions, resources and technological basis for training is simply not there.

For a now rapidly expanding number of countries, these factors are compounded by demographics, where the size, composition and age profile of the entire 'native' work force is declining in number, increasing in age, constricting in breadth. And diminishing relative to increasing numbers of retired people dependant on contributions of the active work force for social security.

This context drives a constantly increasing and now *globalized* international mobility of skills, competences and labour at all skill levels. There are an estimated 232 million people residing today in countries other than where

they were born or are citizens.¹ ILO calculated that 105 million of the 214 million people living outside their countries of birth or citizenship in 2010 were economically active.² That is to say: employed, self-employed or otherwise engaged in remunerative activity. That is about half of the total number and a very high proportion of those of working age. Given an estimate of one accompanying dependent for each active adult, over 90 per cent of migration today is bound up in labour and employment.

These figures do not account for millions of short-term temporary or seasonal migrants, such as Uzbek and Kyrgyz workers in Kazakhstan and Russia, Guatemalans in Mexico, Mozambicans in South Africa, Poles in Portugal, Jamaicans in Canada, among those who go by the tens of thousands to usually nearby countries for a few months each year.

Economic contributions and the employment characteristics of migrants are central to labour markets and labour force composition in more than 100 countries today. For example, foreign born workers now comprise about 10% of labour forces in most Western European countries (30% in Switzerland) and 15%-18% in the 'immigration countries' Australia, Canada and the USA.³ Taking account of the first and second generation children of immigrants gives figures around 20% of work forces "issue de l'immigration" in several Western European countries 19.6% in Germany for example.

For many countries around the world, migration –international labour and skills mobility-- has become the key factor to sustaining and renovating essential processes of development. Here development is understood in its broader sense, not just economic growth measured by gross domestic product. Rather, it means elaboration of means of production and distribution of goods, services and knowledge as well as infrastructure; and of provision of housing, education, healthcare, transportation and other services for the population.

International mobility provides skilled labour, new technological competencies, and work force to provide large shares of labour for agriculture, construction, health care, hotel and restaurant, cleaning and maintenance, and tourism sectors as well to sustain otherwise non-viable sectors and enterprises in many countries.

Migration serves as instrument to adjust the skills, age and sectoral composition of national and regional labour markets. Migration provides responses to fast-changing needs for skills and personnel resulting from technological advances, changes in market conditions and industrial transformations. In countries of ageing populations, migration is replenishing declining work forces and injecting younger workers, in turn contributing to increased dynamism, innovation and domestic mobility in those work forces.

Profile of Labour Migration in Eurasia

International labour and skills mobility has a long history in Eurasia. As detailed below, labour and skills mobility has become a major and permanent feature of economic activity across the region. 24 million foreign born are among the combined population of 274 million people in Eurasia (in 2010), nearly 10 percent. Economically active foreigners –migrant workers-- comprise even higher proportions of work forces.

During Soviet times, centralized command and control over economic and labour factors meant many instances of labour and population movements, often forced. Visible legacies remain of migration by skilled Russian technicians and administrators to soviet States in the Baltics, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and compelled dispersion of ethnic groups from these republics to elsewhere across the USSR.

¹ UN Population Division, (2013). *International Migration Wallchart 2013*. Available at: <http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm>

² ILO, *International Labour Migration: a Rights Based Approach*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2010, page 1.

³ Recent figures for most EU countries and "immigration countries" mentioned are found in the OECD *International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2011 Statistical Annex*

Disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in large population movements with huge economic and employment consequences: emigration or expulsion of Russians from former soviet States, return to homelands of dispersed ethnic populations such as --- to Kazakhstan --as well as *auseidler* to Germany. Rapid economic changes, collapse of labour intensive industries and reduction of State employment provoked new and widening unemployment across Eurasian countries. By the late 1990s demographic ageing and decline combined with emigration from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine were reducing native work forces and requiring replacement workers from outside. Employment needs spurred by economic growth in Kazakhstan surpassed slow population growth. Most countries in Eurasia found that their domestic work forces didn't have the range of skills needed by restructured labour markets facing a globalized capitalist market system.

Although cross border labour demand and supply has rapidly expanded in Eurasia, legal and administrative provisions have not followed to ensure decent work and social protection for the many migrants concerned. Laws and inspection are needed to protect and supervise decent work conditions, occupational safety and health, and fair remuneration for foreign workers. Legislation as well as administrative measures are needed to obtain participation in social security schemes, portability of contributions, and enjoyment of services and retirement benefits for Eurasian migrants working in other Eurasian countries.

Numbers of Migrant workers and distribution among Eurasia countries

Basic data on foreign-born migrant stocks and characteristics provides a general if imprecise profile of migrant worker populations. Data below from 2010 shows stocks of foreign born per country; percent of migrants in the 20-64 working age group, female percentage of working age migrant stocks, migrant percent of total country population, and median age of migrants. This data shows foreign born counted by census and other hard data, reconciled with control factors such as birth and mortality rate projections compared with census data that demonstrate emigration deficits or immigration additions.

MIGRANT/FOREIGN BORN STOCKS AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS IN EURASIA

	Type of data	Migrant Stock in thousands	Migrant % of total population	Migrant stock in 20-64 - working age	% of migrant population in working age	% female of migrant pop in working age	Median age of migrant population
EURASIA Region		24,751.6		17,341	70%		
Armenia	B, R	324.2	9.4	174.1	53.7	58.5	57.9
Azerbaijan	B, R	263.9	3.0	161.8	60.9	56.2	52.9
Belarus	B	1,090.	11.9	747.2	68.5	52.5	52.1

	Type of data	Migrant Stock in thousands	Migrant % of total population	Migrant stock in 20-64 - working age	% of migrant population in working age	% female of migrant pop in working age	Median age of migrant population
		4					
Georgia	B	167.3	3.9	100.6	60.1	57.4	51.4
Moldova	B	408.3	10.9	248.7	60.9	55.1	52.9
Russian Federation	B	12,270.4	10.3	9,570.7	78	58.1	44.1
Ukraine	B	5,257	10.9	3,203	60.9	56.2	52.9
<i>Central Asia region</i>		<i>4,970.1</i>	<i>9.1</i>	<i>2,030.5</i>	<i>70.1</i>	<i>54.4</i>	<i>51.5</i>
Kazakhstan	B	3,079.5	20.8	1,982.2	64.4	53.3	50.9
Kyrgyz Republic	B	222.7	4.4	136.6	61.3	56.7	51.2
Tajikistan	B	284.3	5.1	173.2	60.9	56.2	52.9
Turkmenistan	B	207.7	4.4	126.5	60.9	56.2	52.9
Uzbekistan	B	1,175.9	4.6	716.4	60.9	56.2	52.9

SOURCE: All figures from *The Age and Sex of Migrants 2011 Wallchart*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, 2011.

This data highlights several factors important for economic and social security considerations:

- ▲ migrants/foreign-born represent around 10% of total populations in five Eurasia countries.
- ▲ 20% of Kazakh population is foreign born; a significant portion are returning ethnic Kazakhs.
- ▲ migrants/foreign born represent 3 to 5 percent in 6 other countries; these same countries have large portions of their work force abroad.
- ▲ more than 60% of the foreign-born migrant population is in the 20-64 working age in nearly all countries; it is 78% in the Russian Federation.
- ▲ *migrants* generally comprise higher proportions of the work force than of the population overall, given

usually higher economic activity rates for migrants than for native populations

- ▲ most of the 17.3 million working age migrants in Eurasia can be presumed to be economically active.
- ▲ the female portion of working age migrants is over 52% in all countries, in most it is 56% to 58%.

Valid and comparable data on labour migration, foreign employment and labour market participation by migrants is not available across the region. Estimates of migration flows and composition of stocks vary hugely from an official pronouncement that 10 million foreigners entered the Russian Federation in 2010⁴ (no breakdown between tourists, visitors, short term workers, long term immigrants, etc) to a research estimate that the Russian Federation received 7.1 million people from former USSR countries over 15 years from 1993 to 2009, 60% of whom were ethnic Russians.⁵

Main labour migration movements within Eurasia:

To Russian Federation from Central Asia --Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghizstan and from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine: all skills levels.

To Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghiz Republic; a large portion is seasonal migration for agricultural work. Estimates indicate at least 500,000 Central Asian migrants labour in agriculture during the growing season; not all return to homelands during winter season.⁶

From Eurasia to elsewhere:

From 5 to 33% of labour forces of Eurasia countries are residing abroad.⁷ Workers from Moldova and Ukraine go to Roumania, Italy, Poland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, also to Czech Republic and Slovakia. Significant numbers are employed in agriculture, construction and services.

From Russian Federation emigrants go to USA, Israel, Germany and other EU member countries. Since 1989 more than 1.2 million people left Russia for permanent residence abroad. 45-60,000 contract workers leave annually. An estimated 25-30 million persons of Russian origins live outside Russia, 17 million in CIS and Baltic States.⁸

Also, migrants go from Azerbaijan to Turkey and from Kazakhstan and Kirghiz Republic to the Republic of Korea, and some numbers of Central Asian nationals to Arab Gulf States.

To Eurasia:

High skilled professionals, technicians and managers come from Europe, USA and elsewhere to most Eurasian countries. Also migrants from China, India and Sri Lanka, among other countries. Rough estimates assert 1 million or more Chinese nationals are in the Russian Federation. The presence of South Asians is becoming more evident in countries such as Ukraine, working in jobs otherwise unfilled by the significantly ageing, declining and departing native work force.

Driving Factors for labour migration: obtaining economic progress and productivity

Overall, migration in Eurasia provides:

- ▲ *an essential resource for economic development and productivity;*

⁴ RIA Novosti: "[Russia reports 4 mln illegal migrant workers](#)" Vitaliy Ankov, Moscow, 8-9-10

⁵ Ryazantsev, Sergei V.: *The Modern Migration Policy of Russia: Problems and Necessary Directions of Perfection*, monogram, University of California Davis, 2010.

⁶ Estimates provided to the author by international organizations in Kazakhstan during field visits in 2011.

⁷ World Bank: *Migration and Development: ECA (continued)*, Online brief, WB, Washington DC, undated (accessed 18-3-12) <http://go.worldbank.org/431PWGWRQ0>

⁸ Ryazantsev, Sergei V., op cit (2) and other sources

- ▲ *means of meeting shortages of skills and labour;*
- ▲ *compensation for ageing work forces and demographic decline of populations;*
- ▲ *enhancement of regional economic integration ensuring development and welfare*

In the Eurasia region as elsewhere, migration –international labour and skills mobility-- has become the key factor to sustaining and renovating processes of production of goods, services and knowledge, and of constructing facilities for and providing housing, education, healthcare and transportation.

Expert and institutional assessments signal the crucial importance of migration to a Russian economy facing severe labour and skills shortages. As World Bank Lead Economist Sudharshan Canagarajah put it:

"Between 2004 and 2008 the Russian economy has been growing by 8 percent annually. The number of labor migrants within the same period grew by four times. Evidently, these two figures are linked. In general the input of labor migrants into the Russian economy is estimated at 5-10 percent of Russia's GDP,"⁹

An assessment study on potential for migration from China observed:

In the decade following 1998, Russia's hydrocarbon-fueled economy was continually short of workers. It was thought that by 2010 to 2015 this shortage could reach crisis proportions, as competition intensified among post-secondary educational institutions, the military, and employers for a reduced pool of high school graduates.¹⁰

Sectoral distribution of migrant worker employment in Russia shows where needs are; such distribution is similar to employment of foreign skills and labour in other industrialized countries although elsewhere including Kazakhstan the proportion engaged in agriculture tends to be considerably higher:

"According to official data, 40% of migrant workers are engaged in construction, 30% in commerce, 10% in industry, 7% in agriculture, 5% in transport industry, 8% in other activities. The real employment structure of migrants is a bit different from the official data by the reason of large undercount of them in some services including recreation, housing, household work."¹¹

Similar labour market factors have affected Kazakhstan. In the Ukraine, Belarus and now Azerbaijan, demographic factors also underlie evolving labour and skills shortages. Demographic projections indicate that Russia's population could decline to 116 million by 2050 from 140 million in 2010 without further government reforms.¹² Projections in Ukraine show that the country's population is declining from a peak of 53 million in 1990 to 39 million by 2030.¹³

Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation especially need to incorporate locally non-existent skills and competences, and indeed labour power, in order to redevelop sustainable economies beyond dependence on an inevitably limited oil and gas extraction base.

Regional integration

Labour circulation is a crucial and recognized key to regional integration and development, among the members

⁹ World Bank: *World Bank A Catalyst for Labor Migration Discussions*, Online profile, WB, Washington DC, undated (accessed 18-3-12). <http://go.worldbank.org/TA6NZKKG830>

¹⁰ Repnikova, Maria and Balzer, Harley: *Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities*, Kennan Institute, Washington DC, 2009

¹¹ *Polskikh, Vladislav: Labour Migration To Russia*, Youth Research Group "Nota Bene," Russian Federation, 2008? http://nbenegroup.com/migration/work_en.html

¹² BBC News -Business: "Will labour migrants save Russia's economy?" Konstantin Rozhnov, 27 February 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12571597>

¹³ Estimate provided to author by head of Ukraine national vocational training agency during field visit in 2010.

of the European Union, in the East African Community, in South America's Mercosur. It is key because it is regulated and harnessed in regional, interstate spaces of economic and social integration. It has been on the Eurasia agenda since the establishment of the CIS upon collapse of the USSR. The recent establishment of the Eurasia Economic Union is another step in this direction.

Only such spaces obtain the larger pools of capital, resources, skills and labour necessary to achieve competitive economies of scale and viable markets. Building common markets means economic, political and social cooperation; migration is a fundamental pillar for such cooperation. This means freer circulation of labour in larger markets to better link capital and labour, essential to obtain more productive use of both labour and capital. The EU, Mercosur and other experiences demonstrate that freer circulation of labour and skills –with formal accords on circulation and access to labour markets-- is required to advance *development*.

In a business view reflecting perceptions about gains of advancing regional jintegration, Nikita Krichevsky, chairman of *Opora*, Russian Organization for Small and Medium Entrepreneurship, notes that “The creation of the EEC (Eurasia Economic Community) will contribute to Russia's modernization and industrialization, cut transaction costs and promote international division of labor.¹⁴ He also notes geopolitical implications: “Apart from everything else, the creation of the Eurasian Union provides an economic shield against Chinese expansion.”

Demographic Issues

New evidence based on more accurate forecasting suggests that the world is on the eve of far greater international mobility. This mobility is already prevalent across the Eurasia region.

Within 15 years, the majority of world's countries –and populations-- will be in work force decline and population ageing mode. A few salient examples: Germany loses 5 million members of work force in next ten years. The Russian Federation has lost some 10 million since the year 2000; the current decline is close to 1 million workers annually in its domestic labour force. The Japanese labour force is projected to shrink 37% over the next 25 years. A recent study says that Switzerland will need 400,000 additional workers by 2030. Meanwhile, certain countries project significantly increasing foreign labour. Qatar authorities project bringing in 1 million more migrant workers before 2020, in addition to the approximately 1.5 million comprising 93% of the current work force in that country.

And then there is the big one: recent forecasting indicates that China's work force will decline by between 126 and 180 million people in less than 20 years.

Furthermore, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, both North and South Korea, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan as well as all 28 members of the European Union – and other countries-- have reached or are well below zero population growth fertility rates.¹⁵

That means that over the next 15 years if not already, all of these countries and others face increasing departures from the work force ever less compensated for by the decreasing number of youth entrants.

¹⁴ Krichevsky, Nikita: “Eurasian economic union is a barrier against China” article reproduced from Itogi Magazine in *Russia Behind the Headlines* website, Moscow, December 5, 2011. See.

http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/12/05/eurasian_economic_union_is_a_barrier_against_china_13903.html

¹⁵ Based on country by country data available from the on-line *CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: Total Fertility Rate(s)* at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html>. 2.1 to 2.2 children per woman is considered the ‘replacement rate’ of zero population growth, below which population will decline.

This means increased demand –and competition-- for what is today one of the most crucial economic resource of all today: labour and skills. A recent study calculated that, by 2020, the global shortage of high skilled professionals will reach 40 million, and the shortage of technically trained workers will be another 45 million. Needs for a vast range of skills, such as health care and information technology workers are rising. Demand for cheap, docile, flexible, unprotected labour will also increase.

Migration is the single response able to provide a major portion of workers and skills required to maintain sustainable economic activity in many countries –and across regional integration spaces. Other options can compensate, but only partially at best. For example, labour force forecasting indicated that only some 20% of the projected decline of the Chinese labour force can be compensated for by standard domestic measures: significantly raising retirement age (not politically acceptable), increasing female participation in the work force (already high), productivity increases (proceeding but requiring huge investments of capital not necessarily available), and ongoing strong economic growth (current rates of 7-8% seen as unsustainable in future years).

Migrant skills and labour are already the essential key to maintaining and sustaining viable economic activity – thus development-- across the 'North.' An ILO forecasting exercise several years ago suggested that, if all trends current in Western Europe in 2000 (fertility rates, retirement age, female workforce participation, immigration, modest productivity increases and economic growth rates) the standard of living measured by per capita income of gross domestic product would be 22% lower by 2050.

Policy data versus migration data

The current data and consequent discussion on migration, demographics and development largely miss the essential role and relationship of migration to economic growth and development. Demographic data available largely fails to see the actual and future impact of demographic transitions on labour force composition and age profiles. But these factors are those essential to sustaining viable economies North and South, and factors that are determinant in labour and skills demand and supply, meaning international migration.

Both migration and demographics research generally ignore the specificity of labour force demographics. The recent emergence of new methodological approaches notwithstanding, these fields at present are projecting trends, consequences and remedies to phenomena that will have fundamental effects on national economic viability of countries worldwide in the next two decades.

In consequence, labour migration –labour and skills mobility—is not being addressed as the primary factor it is of economic activity and thus engine for and sustaining development and social welfare. Instead, a dominant trend remains of construction and reinforcement of control and restriction regimes that thwart a deliberate and regulated response to growing needs for labour and skills mobility.

When labour does move as it must, it is all too often subject to abuse, exploitation and draconian repressive measures. Those who suffer most are the many persons simply obeying –often with little choice—the laws of supply and demand of the globalized capitalist market economy. In this situation, the basic dignity and rights of migrants as workers and human beings are undermined, especially those in irregular situations.

The indications cited earlier urge attention to accelerating research approaches on intersecting labour/work force profile analysis, demographic projections and migratory considerations. This means disaggregating national and non-national factors.

Effective policy depends on good data. Substantial data is required on “labour demographic” factors, including working age population, economically active, employed, formal versus informal activity numbers and rates, etc. As well, the intersection of demographics, migration and development requires specific assessments of situations

and trends in skills profiles, skills evolution, skills training, and relationships between evolution of domestic skills and labour supply and training factors in relation to overall evolution of needs and demand-- in order to distinguish projections of likely domestic resources versus what will not be met by domestic factors.

The Governance Framework

The elaboration of national and international systems of government over the last century recognized that the economic processes of capitalist industrialization required normative regulation to provide protection and decent conditions for persons engaged in work. Regulation was also essential to support employment, to ensure social protection and to invoke social dialogue to resolve contentions between the main economic actors: employers and workers.

International concern for protection of workers outside their own countries was explicitly established in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. The first international conference on migration took place in 1923, in Bologna, Italy, convened by the Italian government under ILO auspices to press the destination countries of the day to reduce the terrible abuse of migrants. The first international treaties with provisions on legal and social protection for migrant workers were drawn up in the 1930s. Subsequently, a range of instruments in five areas of international law established a comprehensive framework of legal norms for governance. These are:

The nine main Human Rights Conventions; 2) all up-to-date International Labour Standards; 3) the widely ratified 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, 4) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; and 5) the two Protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants to the Convention against transnational organized crime.

Specific regional instruments on human rights, migrant workers, refugees, and trafficking established by the African Union, the Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization of American States provide further normative guidance in their respective regions. As well, normative frameworks for free circulation of people, access to work, residency and social protection and specific rights guarantees have been or are being established in a number of regional economic communities in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe as well as in the emerging Eurasian Economic Community.

At the core of the legal regime for migration governance are three complementary, sequential instruments specifically on migrant workers and migration for employment: ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (of 1949), ILO Convention 143 on migrant workers (Supplementary Provisions) (of 1975), and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW).¹⁶ All three contain norms for administration of migration and provisions for international cooperation as well as specific standards protecting the rights of migrant workers and their families.

87 countries have ratified at least one of these three instruments, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kirghiz Republic, Moldova, and Tajikistan in the Eurasia region. Counting in not yet ratified signatories of the ICRMW, 98 countries are legally bound to uphold migrants rights on their territories. This represents some two-thirds of all countries for which migration is a significant economic, social and political governance concern, meaning they have committed to putting national migration legislation, policy and practice within the framework of international standards.

Governance shifts; redefining a new regime for labour?

The governance structure for migration –and the ideology as well as practice of governance of migration-- is changing in both old and new immigration countries. The locus of migration governance in immigration or

¹⁶ Texts and related information available respectively at www.ilo.org/ilolex and www.unhchr.ch

migrant receiving States over previous decades was generally in labour and employment-concerned ministries. This designation reflected the primacy of needs to regulate labour markets and protect workers as well as oversee employment relations and social dialogue. Those ministries retained the vitally important competences not only in labour market administration, but also in supporting and mediating as needed dialogue and negotiation between social partners, the employers and the unions representing the collective voice of workers—including migrants. This reflected the reality that then and now, regardless of migrant motivations whether seeking employment, refugee flight, family reunion, environmental displacement, or pursuing studies, some 90% of migration results in employment outcomes or is directly dependent on those who are economically active.

Security and control institutions of States now increasingly predominate in managing and controlling migration, and migrants. This appears to be coincident with a broad redefinition of conditions for labour. The treatment imposed on a substantial migrant component of work forces can and does influence treatment of the work force more broadly. Administration of the increasing foreign component of work forces by interior or home affairs ministries has significant consequences in shifting emphasis of law enforcement affecting workplaces from labour standards to immigration enforcement. Similarly, in imposing policing solutions to labour conflicts at the expense of social dialogue.

Coincidentally, movement monitoring and control measures have been strengthened worldwide, with imposition of pervasive identity document, surveillance and border control mechanisms. International travellers as well as migrants are now subject to identity and control measures previously only utilized for criminals and suspects in democratic regimes: fingerprinting and other biometric tracing data incorporated into now standard travel documents.

Globally integrated movement tracking permits permanent surveillance of travellers and facilitates restricting, detaining or intimidating movement by persons considered undesirable by a particular government. Such enhanced and universalized control measures have implications for exercise of freedom of association rights in internationalized labour markets and employer chains. It also raises concern for exercise of freedom of movement and for safety of dissidents to authoritarian regimes. More generally, the tightened control on movement facilitate tightened control on workers and work forces, restricting realization of rights to change employers or employment areas to escape exploitative or oppressive conditions –or to organize across .

Another redefinition is aggressive promotion of short term, temporary, and seasonal migration regimes, often under the generic misnomer “circular migration.” Advocates of expanded 'circular migration' characterize it as the solution to both employment needs and to protecting 'national cohesion and cultural integrity' of nation states demanding migrant workers. 'Circular migration' temporary migration regimes tend to offer explicitly restricted application of labour rights, such as exclusion of freedom of association while subjecting migrants and their employers to reduced- or non-application of labour standards and prevailing levels of remuneration.

A justificatory discourse in promotion of such temporary regimes posits that the level of rights protections is negotiable. The terminology of *rights versus numbers* and *the price of rights* is used to show the advantages of trade offs where wider access by migrant workers to higher wage labour markets would be obtained by accepting reductions in application of labour rights. The unsustainable argument that lowering wages instigates creation of more jobs is not infrequently invoked in this discourse.

At the international level, the existing multilateral institutional architecture is being abandoned. The roles and competences of the relevant UN agencies as well as specific migration outcomes of World Conferences over the last 20 years have been diminished. The promotion and application of international normative standards is explicitly reduced. Instead, closed intergovernmental “States' owned” platforms for consultation and deal making on migration have been built outside the UN system. While these are often defined as representing 'governments,' participation is predominantly by delegates of interior ministries and State security agencies. This has also occurred at regional level, outside existing multilateral institutions responsible for migration regimes in

regional communities of States.

Steps forward

However the global future evolves, migration will be ever more important. Demographic and mobility trends, their implications and policy choices will be determinants to economic and social productivity, even the viability of economies throughout the world, and particularly in the Eurasia region.

While the starting point is having relevant data and knowledge, what is also crucial is the governance agenda.

Key policy and practical lines are highlighted in the ILO Multilateral Framework for Labour Migration¹⁷ Actions and responses to address the migration-development agenda must include:

Research and Data (Knowledge base):

1. Obtaining *collection and analysis of relevant labour migration, labour demographics and labour market data* to elaborate 'evidence based' policy and practice.
- Research on intersecting labour force profile analysis, demographic projections and migratory considerations, meaning in particular disaggregation of national and non-national factors.
- Specific assessments of situations and trends in skills profiles, skills evolution, skills training, and relationships between evolution of domestic skills and labour supply
- Training/skills needs and formation factors in relation to overall evolution of needs and demand-- in order to distinguish projected domestic resources versus evolving needs that will not be met by domestic numbers, skills sets, educational output, etc.

Governance

The demographic-migration-development intersections require explicit policy interventions to obtain economic well-being as well as social cohesion. Thematic areas for governance include:

2. Establishing or strengthening a '**rights-based**' *policy framework* addressing the demographic, mobility, economic, social and development considerations.
3. **Identifying and expanding regimes of free circulation** of persons/labour, particularly in regional economic integration processes.
4. **Enforcing minimum decent work standards in all sectors of activity**, to suppress abuse of workers and ensure necessary equality of treatment, non-discrimination and decent work conditions for all workers.
5. Extending social protection, specifically **social security coverage and portability**, to migrant workers
6. Enacting and implementing plans of **action against discrimination and xenophobia**.
7. **Institutional mechanisms for policy formulation and administration of labour migration**, particularly in the ministries responsible for labour and employment
8. Putting in place **informed and transparent labour migration systems** to meet measured, legitimate labour needs –in context of a vision for integration and development
9. Providing adequate and current **vocational education and training** to meet both national needs and international demand.

This brief and the above suggested 'recommendations' remain a work in process, subject to further precisions. History tells us that migration has been an essential ingredient of growth and development of many countries. And it will be essential to economic survival in the years to come. However, unless regulated by appropriate

¹⁷ ILO, *Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2006. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_343_engl.pdf

laws and policies, migration entails high costs in violations of rights of persons, in social disruption, in reduced productivity, and in lost opportunities for development.

Migration must be governed under the rule of law, with the involvement of key stakeholders, notably employers and worker unions as well as civil society. It must uphold equality of treatment and the full application of rights and protection for all workers present in any country.

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This paper reflects the professional specialist perspective of the author. It does not necessarily represent the views of GMPA or its respective Associates.

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